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1 REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE
CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK
Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) has in the past
three decades witnessed different levels of, and at-
tempts to, build economic integration. Economic
Cooperation has been widely seen as a step towards
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) goal of
political and economic union. However the eco-
nomic integration experience leaves much to be de-
sired. The once moderately advanced example of
multi-purpose integration, the East African
Community, collapsed in 1977. The Economic Com-
munity of the Central African States (ECCs) and the
Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
(CEPGL) have stagnated to the extent of failing to
pay staff. SADC is, despite its infrastructural and
food security coordination and development creden-
tials, too dependent on external financial backing.
The Inter-government Authority on Drought and
Development (IGADD) and the Indian Ocean
Commission (IOC) have been effectively non-
functional. PTA while slow to start operations,
particularly tangible projects; has begun to gain
momentum in some aspects of fiscal and bureau-
cratic trade barrier1 reduction and associated areas.
The global and sub-regional changes have given rise
to new concerns, added impetus and a sense of
urgency leading to:
j the June 1991 Abuja OAU Summit declaration
establishing a hypothetical institutional framework
for the phased development over a 34 year period of
a pan-African Economic community (AEC) initially
based on sub-regional economic groupings such as
the PTA, SADC and ECOWAS. By June 1993, a total
of 28 OUA member states had ratified the Treaty.
Independent consultant - formerly with United Nations Institute
for Namibia, Preferential Trade Area, Eastern and Southern African
Management Institute.
For example, the PTA Trade and Development Bank, the PTA
Clearing House and the PTA Reinsurance Company (ZEP-RE), the
strongest of which is the Clearing House for intra-regional
transactions based in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
2 Most seem largely oblivious to the dismal economic performance
of South Africa for more than a decade as well as the major domestic
economic as well as socio-political transition problems facing it.
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ii Namibian independence and the collapse of
apartheid, opening the possibility of South Africa
playing a 'normal' role in a post-apartheid Southern
Africa with its economy integrated into the sub-
regional economy2 leading to on-going AFDB
(African Development Bank) SADC and other
reviews in Africa as well as review of donor strate-
gies for support to the sub-region.
iii recent trends to liberalize, deregulate and priva-
tize the public sector, allow market forces to allocate
resources and subject them to national and interna-
tional competition. The speed at which countries are
pursuing IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAP), e.g. sweeping tariff reduction
pose problems as, e.g., the PTA preferences in phased
tariff cuts for example may be overtaken by the swift
country reforms.3
iv the August 1992 transformation of the SADCC
(Southern African Development Coordination Con-
ference) from an inter-governmental coordination
exercise into a more formalized and strengthened
Southern African Development Community (SADC).
y the on-going review of the PTA Treaty intended
to usher in a Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA).
vi current efforts to revive the East African
Community and to merge SADC and PTA - each
tending to be carried out without much reference
to other initiatives.4
vii increased efforts for greater South-South
Cooperation through the Non-Aligned Movement
See, Boidin (1988); Blayo (1992); Mwase (1992). This is exacerbated
by World Bank-supported on-going initiatives to establish a regime
of trade liberalization and cross-border investment within the PTA1
SADC area withno coordination with eitherSADC or PTA initiatives.
The SADC/PTA basic issue is whether detailed sectoral integration
is practicable at this time over a Khartoum to Capetown span as in
practice the two bodies do not compete operationally. The EAC
revival (which has rather more political rhetoric than substantial
proposals to date) is harder to fit in - Kenya and Uganda accession
to SADC or Tanzanian withdrawal - neither likely - would seem to
be necessary if more than a loose consultative group with a few joint
programmes is envisaged.
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(NAM) and in particular the South Commission and
its Geneva-based South Centre. The Commissions's
Report (1990) shows how the present world's
trade, financial and technological regimes handicap
the South.
viii a new political environment calling for democra-
tization, transparency and accountability in public
affairs. We could note however, the resurgence of
strong pockets of conservatism in Eastern Europe
and the ex-USSR republics threatening the on-going
international democratization process.
1.1 Regional integration benefits
Successful regional economic integration can help
the sub-region attain greater economies of scale,
widen markets, enhance industrial efficiency,
reduce the sub-region's external dependence and
the vulnerability of its economy and enhance
Pan-Africanist and South-South 'collective self-
reliance' as well as providing a scale and experience
base for increasing global market competitiveness.
Furthermore, regional integration can provide the
following benefits:5
i greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the outside
world. As Green and Seidman (1968) argued, joint
inter-state projects would enhance prospects for over-
coming Africa's dependence on Metropoles;
ii minimization of duplication, thin spreading of
resources and wasteful competition via excess capac-
ity creation;
iii a cheaper and more efficient transportation and
communications system;
iv reorientation of enterprises to utilize and de-
velop new markets and sources within the region;
y greater division of labour and specialization in
production;
vi greater prospects for technological advance and
innovation;
vii expansion of trade, incomes and employment
due to the free movement of goods, services, labour
and capital;
viii increased foreign investment;
For an elaboration of these benefits see Robson (1983).
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ix enhanced political solidarity. As the UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (UN/ECA) has ar-
gued, 'the dominance of the subsistence sector in
most African economies, the fragmented national
markets, the underutilization of resources and the
excessive external orientation of African economies
all combine to make economic cooperation indispen-
sable for the rapid and self-reliant transformation of
Africa' (1977: 2).
1.2 Distribution of benefits
Economic integration among partner states with
geographical proximity and differential levels of
underdevelopment reflected in industrial imbal-
ances and trade deficits exhibit polarization effects
with greater gains accruing to the partner state with
superior economic and social infrastructure, more
attractive to foreign investment. More crucial, these
may be so severe that other states are net losers
(as Tanzania and Uganda probably were in the pre-
1977 East African Common Market and associated
institutions). A number of devices to check and
redress unduly unequal benefits are available in the
literature. These include joint projects (e.g. regional
enterprises) as well as to more standard compensa-
tion and market intervention measures. Individual
partner states view joint projects and revenues differ-
ently. Joint ventures can be viewed as:
i entirely external entities.
ii one half internal and the other external.
iii internal, provided own revenue shares (i.e. the
cost and revenues), are attributed to each country.
Theoretically imbalances in enterprises and more
generally could be resolved through:
i proportional distribution of benefits according
to the economic sizes of the national economies;
ii 'uncontrolled' sharing of benefits, with more
accruals to the strongest and fastest growing econo-
mies and a danger of net losses to the weakest;
iii the redistribution of benefits in favour of the
poorer and slower growing economies;
iv the literally equal distribution of benefits irre-
spective of economic size or growth rate.
The East African Community for example adopted The PTA has a wide membership. In Table 1),
option (iii), above. In addition to the transfer tax
allowing to a partner state facing intra-regional
balance of payments deficits, the imbalances were
partially redressed through decentralization of
community institutions and via the East African
Development Bank (EADB) which had allocation
principles favourable via the less industrialized
partners. Until the EADB charter was altered in
1980, Tanzania and Uganda were targeted to receive
38.75 per cent of the loans with Kenya left with
22.5 per cent.6
ECOWAS maintains a fund for cooperation, com-
pensation and development to finance projects in
poorer member states, and to compensate for losses
caused by the establishment of Community enter-
prises or by the process of trade liberalization. Both
the PTA Development Strategy for the 1990s and the
proposed Treaty for a Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) provide for special
emphasis on the development of the PTA's
economically depressed areas. In practice, literal
transfer payments do not work - recipients believe
them far too small and providers far too large, a
pattern of perception effecting West, Central and
South African arrangements not just EAC.
2 THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING-PTA, SADC
AND OTHER COORDINATING ORGANS
Regional integration in ESA is dominated by PTA
and SADC. The PTA is the second largest economic
grouping in Africa after ECOWAS (or the third if
the South African Customs Union Arrangements
are included). The objectives and provisions of the
PTA (1980) Treaty go beyond a normal 'Preferential
Trade Area' more or less copying the EEC Treaties
with clauses from the Andean Pact thrown in.
It provides not only for trade liberalization and
promotion through removal of tariff and non-
tariff barriers but also sector policy coordination,
harmonization, and cooperation in agriculture, in-
dustry transport and communications, money and
banking and joint investment programmes. The PTA
Trade and Development Bank with trade and
development windows, and the PTA Clearing
House are to increase cost-effectiveness in foreign
exchange utilization.
6 Preliminary data suggested that under the new arrangements
Tanzania was a net gainer, as perhaps was Uganda. Neither the
dynamics nor the stability of the system can be assessed because
with the 1972 access to power of Idi Amin in Uganda forward
progress was halted by irreconcilable political divergences and the
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countries 1-10 are actual or potential PTA members
which are also SADC members; 6-9 are countries
which are also SACU (South African Customs Union)
members and 10-12 are ex-EAC members. The PTA
therefore brings together countries with different
backgrounds and experiences, including island and
landlocked countries.
The PTA includes all the SADC countries except
Botswana, the ex-ECA countries, the Great Lakes
countries except for Zaire which is in the process of
joining. It also includes the Horn countries of Eibouti,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan is in the process of
joining. In practice the PTA has not been operational
in the Horn or Sudan because of the war ravaged
context and because there were few pre-existing
formal trade or transport links. In the Indian Ocean,
Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros are members but
- for less evident reasons - no sub-regional pro-
grammes to serve their special subregional interest
(e.g. as to shipping) have been begun.
The PTA sub-region suffers from minimal intra-
sectoral linkages and from intra-PTA trade largely
focusing on pre existing links around Kenya and
Zimbabwe with very limited flows beyond those
poles partly because high irttra-PTA unit transport
costs erode potential comparative advantages.
Transport constraints include cumbersome vehicle
licensing procedures, a multiplicity of transit fees
including road tolls (both somewhat harmonized
under the leadership of the UNCTAD centre in Ma-
lawi but more in the SADC and Tanzania-Rwanda-
Burundi-Uganda sub-areas than for PTA as a whole)
inefficiency, unreliability and operational inadequa-
cies of transport services. Trade is also hampered by
poor communication (beyond the SADC/ex-EAC
range), lack of production complementarity and the
PTA's unwieldy size. Trade is further hampered by
a shortage of trained, experienced and competent
manpower and an enterprise orientation to national
and overseas not regional markets.7
A new PTA Trade and Development Strategy
seeks to:
j increase goods production through agro-
industries.
inability of the Uganda side to act effectively on new production and
market management proposals.
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana and, probably, Mauritius
are partial exceptions to that generalization.
TABLE 1: THE ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE INTEGRATING COUNTRIES IN EASTERN
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
Proportion of GOP (%)
+ SADCCrnember
* Not yet PTA member
** Joined under neighbouring state clause of PTA
Source: World Bank Economic indicators (vanous years)
ii develop transport and communications particu-
larly railways.
iii create an environment conducive to the private
sector development.
iv promote intra-PTA technical assistance coopera-
tion programmes ,and
y devise special programmes to assist the PTA
least developed countries.
The Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC) - now Development Commu-
nity (SADC) was established to:
j reduce economic dependence especially, but not
only, on South Africa.
ii forge links to create an equitable sub-regional
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economic grouping.
iii mobilize resources to promote and implement
sub-regional integration policies.
iv secure international co-operation for economic
liberation and 'collective self-reliance'.
Can it continue to play its original role in the
evolving post-apartheid situation? This concern
has been addressed through the decision to
transform SADCC into an economic community.
SADCC took a sector coordination approach, begin-
ning with emphasis on transport and food security
broadly defined, increasingly stressing production
(especially by the private sector) and of late
promoting intra-regional trade, which stands at 4 per
cent of the sub-region's overall trade. The SADC
includes the Maputo-based Southern African Trans-
port and Communications Commission (SATCC)
J
Area Population GOP Agncutture Industry & Services Exports Imports
(km2, 000) (million) (s million) (%) minIng (%) (s million) (s million)
(%)
1. Angola+ 1,247 9.2 2.490 44 27 29 500 340
2. Malawi+ 118 76 1,070 33 22 45 308 236
3. MózatTibique+ 783 14.5 1,800 40 15 45 236 71g
4 Zambia+ 553 7.6 2,293 45 41 14 796 861
5. Zimbabwe+ 391 8,8 4,670 44 40 16 1,173 1,144
6 Botswana*+ 600 1.2 342 34.3 28.3 37.5 367 467
7. Swaiilanth 17 0.5 411 33.3 35.7 30.8 223 41
8. Lesotho+ 30 1.6 268 54.1 7.3 37.5 18 44
9. Namibia+ 825 1.6 1,050 51 36 13 905 856
10. Tanzania+ 945 23.0 5,623 39 21 45 345 1,161
11. Kenya 585 22.1 6,590 45 16 34 1,262 1,916
12. Uganda 236 16.6 1,389 38 7 55 309 510
13. Rwanda** 26 65 2,024 37 21 42 126 301
14. Burundi** 28 5.0 1,100 30 15 55 129 225
15. Ethiopia 1,251 44.8 4,045 43 24 33 414 1,267
16. Somalia 638 6.9 1,852 29 11 60 115 452
17. Madagascar 587 10.9 2,810 46 20 34 394 641
18. Djibouti 21.7 0.33 282 n.a. n.a n.a. 39 288
19. Comoros 2.2 0.4 152 n.a. n.a. n.a. 18 82
20. Seythelles 00.44 0.7 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. 52 93
21. Mauritius 1,030 1.90 1,062 n.a. n.a. n.a. 304 441
22. Sudan** 2,506 23.9 11,240 52 15 33 486 1,223
23. Zalre** 2,345 33,4 6,470 35 34 31 2,207 1,954
whose priority sectoral programme includes surface
transport, civil aviation, telecommunications, energy
and manpower development projects. Despite its
disengagement thrust, SADC has been characterized
- like most of its Member States - by over dependence
on foreign aid. Of the 201 transport and communica-
tions projects nominally costing US$ 5.07 billion
under implementation in 1989/90, US$ 4.58 billion or
80 per cent was externally sourced.8
The SADC has a unique structure and development
role in the sub-region. SADC sectoral programmes
are coordinated by member states. Transport and
communication is coordinated by Mozambique, the
main transit country. Zimbabwe with the most ad-
vanced agricultural sector has been entrusted with
overall coordination of the agricultural related ac-
tivities with sub-units for specialized topics in Bot-
swana, Malawi and Lesotho as well as in Zimbabwe.
Other sectors are coordinated as follows: Mining
(Zambia), Energy (Angola), Trade and Industries
(Tanzania), Manpower Development (Swaziland),
Off-Shore Fishing (Namibia) and Information
(Mozambique). Distribution of SADC coordinating
units avoids heavy and expensive centralized
bureaucracy not linked to substantive operations,
enhances national commitment and involvement
in identification, formulation and implementation
of SADC.
SADC projects are essentially country initiated and
jointly sectoral unit/governmental representatives
accepted (or rejected) and prioritized. The project
selection and implementation system is innovative.
First, the sector coordinating country through the
Sector Coordinating Unit prepares the prioritized
sectoral plan of regional SADC projects (submitted
by Member States) benefiting more than two SADC
countries with approval by the Sectoral Committees
of Officials and Ministers. The sectoral proposals are
submitted to, and approved by, the Council of
Ministers before presentation to donors. Despite
this arrangement donors have formal and informal
ways of advancing their agenda upon Governments
'This is slightly misleading as local resource inputs are in some cases
not fully covered. The basic causes of the imbalance are, a) collapse
of earned import capacity from 1979 parallel to SADCC's
development; b) the (inevitable for inter-state projects in transport
and communication) large size and high import content of the bulk
of the expenditure on SADCC coordinated projects; c) the use of
SADCC to mobilize resources - especially in transport and
communications - for States with particular problems in securing
themin purelybilateral contexts (Mozambique, Angola,fordifferent
reasons Zimbabwe).
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and sub-regional institutions, albeit less so than
if no regionally backed prioritized sectoral proposals
were presented. Detailed preparation and execution
of project(s), is done by the respective SADC
countries which are responsible for projects under
their jurisdiction including loan repayments,
though in Transport and Communication substan-
tial SATCC technical assistance is frequently
provided.
There is nominally substantial duplication and over-
lapping of roles between SADC and PTA. The
transformation of SADCC into SADC potentially
sharpens the overlap between SADC and PTA, for
it allows SADC to expand its activities into the
fiscal barriers to trade areas in which the PTA is
already active. Whereas it would be irrational to
have nine countries with two institutions running
more or less similar programmes, we could note
that potential PTA programmes in the non-SADC,
PTA members do not in any way duplicate those
of SADC while PTA's non-trade and clearing
functions do not in practice cover the SADC area,
and SADC's sectoral coordination focus is not,
in practice, paralleled by PTA.9
There are substantial differences between the two
organizations. The PTA builds upon EC-type neo-
liberal free trade principles, whereas the SADC has
concentrated on limited sectoral planning and coor-
dination. The SADCC grew out of the coordinated
efforts by the Front Line States to liberate Southern
Africa and to protect against South African aggres-
sion in contrast to PTA which grew out of the
UNECA's plans for a pan-African Common Market.
Furthermore, SADC is smaller and more manage-
able, PTA is larger and includes members with virtu-
ally no actual or immediate potential trade links. The
fact of negligible actual operational overlap can be
argued as a factor facilitating merger or a reason for
cooperative parallel existence. However, the politi-
cal changes in Southern Africa have called into ques-
tion the continued maintenance of both SADC and
PTA in post-apartheid Southern Africa, if South
'In practice PTA's nominal SADC area transportand communications
proposals (from the Secretariat) are a distraction - SATCC is the
operative body. Similarly, in the 1991-1993 drought/famine crisis
SADC's Food Security Unit was instrumental in global mobilisation
for its Member Sates while PTA's parallel unit limited itself to
exhortations with no evident impact in respect to the SADC area or,
more seriously non-SADC PTA Member needs (which, in practice,
their non functional specialist drought and disaster group IGADD,
did not serve either).
Africa prefers to be a member of a single body. The
general consensus emerging amongst donors and,
less uniformly, in ESA is a SADC/PTA merger.
The prevalent emphasis on national as against
sub-regional projects is due to donor preferences in
financing infrastructural projects on a bilateral
basis and of SADC's view that separate national
management of the components of cross-border
projects usually works better, a pattern accentuated
by submission to donors of some national projects
with rather tenuous sub-regional focus/impact. With
Governments submitting sub-regional project pri-
orities to different donors via different sub-regional
organizations, coordination at national, sub-
regional and donor level becomes difficult
particularly in the PTA case which lacks the SADC-
type 'annual consultative conferences' and in which
the Secretariat in practice dominates resolution
formulation, but not state action.
An analysis of alternative regional integration
framework in ESA must be juxtaposed against
vested interests in favour of existing groupings,
e.g. greater Southern African integration in the
context of an enlarged SACU in a post-apartheid
Southern Africa or a negotiated SACU/SADC merger.
Or one can cite the current frenetic attempts to 'revive
the East African Community' in the face of the strong
competing desires to strengthen PTA and SADC.
A PTA-initiated sub-regional organizations integra-
tion study was undertaken in 1988/89 but its recom-
mendations were not implemented largely because
PTA could hardly be seen as an impartial arbiter.
Revisiting, up-dating and implementing the recom-
mendations of the study under less partisan auspices
would do away with some organizations
(potentially including PTA), reduce duplication and
increase complementarity. It could also decentralize
functions from headquarters to field offices, e.g. from
ECA to MULPOCs and to Governments (or within
PTA with MULPOC wound up as 99 per cent
non-functional and 100 per cent duplicative of either
SADC or PTA or both).
A framework and procedures for PTA/SADC
cooperation through information sharing, consulta-
This slightly curious pattern of voting by SADC Member States,
who are a majority in PTA, appears to relate to the PTA process of
Secretariatdrafted resolutions which are subject to limited discussion
or amendment versus a SADC Council of Ministers/Heads of State
Summit pattern of usually nationally drafted and virtually always
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tion, coordination and joint programming was
agreed by the two Secretariat in March 1991. How-
ever the potential duplication in physical infrastruc-
ture, energy, basic industries, trade, monetary
harmonization and insurance schemes, convinced
the PTA Secretariat that harmonization of activities
is unattainable without a merger, particularly given
a post-apartheid scenario and donor anxieties. Hence
the January 1992 PTA Summit (with nine SADC
countries represented) opted for a merger. However,
there are fears in some quarters that the merger
would give rise to a large, unwieldy grouping of
sharply divergent characteristics that would compli-
cate rather than facilitate the integration process.
Against this background and especially the
transformation of SADCC into SADC, the PTA Au-
thority at their January 1993 Summit revisited their
earlier decision and set up a PTA/SADC Ministerial
Committee to review the situation and make
recommendations on the rationalization of the activi-
ties of both organizations.'°
3 ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: THE SOUTH
AFRICAN DIMENSION
The end of apartheid provides great scope for
economic cooperation in Southern Africa. South
Africa is in, and of, Africa. Geographical proximity,
communal interests, colonial practice and economic
laws have bound it solidly with ESA. With the
strongest economy in Africa (albeit one of the poorest
in recent performance) and the end of sanctions and
disinvestment, it stands to benefit from easier
access to the African market replacing in some
cases European and North American suppliers. With
industrial and technological advance, South Africa
can provide a bridge between ESA and the industri-
alized world. South Africa's modern sectors (mining,
industrial complexes, business and financial houses)
are integrally linked with Western Europe, the
USA and of late, the newly industrializing countries
of the Far East.
The SADC countries have substantial trade and
transport links with, and dependency on, South
Africa. Zimbabwe is the PTA's strongest economy.
Zimbabwe, for instance, currently runs a substantial
trade surplus within the PTA. Although this is partly
heavily debated and amended resolutions on basic policy issues.
Given the historic hostility of ECA/PTA to SADC (only partially
reciprocated) no initiative by PTA (or for that matter ECA or SADC)
acting unilaterally can be expected to be fruitful.
because of the short-term credit advances under
the PTA Clearing House, given the relative strength
of Zimbabwe's economy, it would exist anyway.
Despite this Zimbabwe is very dependent on
South Africa as market, middleman, supplier and
carrier (albeit prior to South African trade
discrimination Zimbabwe had a growing trade
surplus with South Africa in textiles-steel rod-
wood products-leather products and prior to
Rhodesia's illegal declaration of independence used
Mozambican not South African ports for global
trade). South Africa has a rail network of 23,740 kms
and handles about 170 million tons of cargo per
annum as against Zimbabwe's 3,394 kms and 12-13
million tons per year. As of 1993, 60 per cent of
Zimbabwe's trade went through South Africa albeit
the pre-Rhodesian 'independence' level was 10 per
cent excluding trade with South Africa. Others are
even more dependent: 90 per cent of Malawi's
external trade goes through Durban, South Africa
though purely as a result of South African inspired
destruction of the much shorter, lower cost routes
to Nacala and Beira. The sub-region's future is
closely linked with that of South Africa albeit
the patterns of links by 2000 is unclear because recent
changes relate so integrally to destabilization and the
underlying South African goods for migrant labour
plus hard currency format is in fact not acceptable
in the medium term to either side.
4 INTEGRATION PROGRAMMES BETWEEN
SOUTH AFRICA AND HER NEIGHBOURS
i The South African Customs Union (SACU) in-
cludes the absence of trade barriers within the Cus-
toms Union and a common external tariff. In SACU
trade creation has benefited the exporters, primarily
South Africa, the main source of imports by its SACU
partners. Trade diversion lowers welfare for the
latter if imports are diverted from more efficient, cost
competitive world market sources to expensive sub-
stitutes from less efficient SACU partners, as appears
to be the case for up to three quarters of present
trade11 - at least at the prices South African enter-
prises have charged captive markets. The SACU
arrangements have had other drawbacks:
j large trade imbalances between South Africa
and her less industrialized SACU partners basically
"Appears because South African suppliers usually change domestic
- not export prices. In the absence of protection, some could and
would meet global prices foregoing excess profits (customs union
rents) rather than markets.
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settled from extra regional hard currency export
earnings (except for Lesotho's which represent largely
the counterpart of migrant worker earnings);
ii unequal distribution of benefits in favour of
South Africa;
iii loss by the BLS countries of control over fiscal
policy especially indirect taxation. The tariff is - with
a few exceptions, e.g. soda ash - directed by Pretoria's
socio-econon-iic needs and philosophy.
Research effort has sought to find out whether:
i the revenue-sharing formula adequately com-
pensates the BLS countries for polarization and other
adverse effects
ii the BLS countries would raise the same revenue
if they withdrew from SACU and imposed their own
tariffs.
Selwyn (1975) concluded that Botswana and
Swaziland might not fare worse with respect to lost
revenue and customs duties if they left SACU. The
question is hardly worth exploring in the case of
Lesotho which is entirely surrounded by South Af-
rica. However, the BLS countries perceive tangible
economic benefits. These benefits include substan-
tial access to the South African money, capital and
labour markets. This is acknowledged in Article
30, Annex XII of the PTA Treaty which granted
the BLS countries 'temporary exemptions from the
full application of certain provisions of the Treaty'.
However, by 1994 Namibia and Botswana would
probably have left SACU had not the internal changes
in South Africa justified a broader, more extended
review of their options.
The greatest potential for integration between
South Africa and the rest of Africa is in trade.
Pretoria has been trading with nearly all African
countries; in some cases under contractual links such
as the Zimbabwe and Malawi trade agreements of
1964 and 1967 respectively (both since amended in
South Africa's favour, de facto unilaterally). South
Africa's latest thrust has been in the development of
trade links with key African countries particularly
Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire.
South Africa supplies substantial electric power to
its neighbours. It supplies nearly 100 per cent and 65
per cent of Lesotho and Swaziland requirements
respectively. However, Mozambique's Cahora Bassa
and Namibia's Ruacana Falls dams in turn were
designed to meet substantial power needs of South
Africa. The Pretoria financed Lesotho Highland
Water Project could provide substantial HEP to
South Africa, albeit its chief export product is water.
In the medium term South Africa is a hydro power
and water deficit country.
South and Central African countries currently de-
pend extensively on South African ports, railways,
highways, airports and other transit transport
facilities albeit, except for Lesotho, history (not
least that of violent destabilization), not underlying
economic logic, accounts for the bulk of the use.
South Africa rolling stock has served as far north
as Zaire, and presently Kenya. In some years, a
daily average of 8,000 SATS rail trucks and 40
locomotives were on SADC rail lines. South Africa
was in the past very dependent on the port of
Maputo which remains the logical outlet for much of
the Rand Triangle once rehabilitation and moderni-
zation are complete and - when Trans Kalahari
highway links are improved - Walvis Bay (now
reincorporated in Namibia) is likely to become a not
insignificant Atlantic access port for the Rand.
Migrant labour, and of late skilled personnel from
independent Africa, have worked in South African
mines, other enterprises and educational institu-
tions. Worker remittances contributes as much as 50
per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 15 per cent
of Government revenue in Lesotho and Swaziland
respectively. This will be affected by post-apartheid
adjustments, except perhaps for Lesotho which
logically should seek economic union with post-
apartheid South Africa.
5 POTENTIAL COOPERATION AREAS
Areas of cooperation between South Africa and her
neighbours include cross-border investment, joint
river basis development, environmental conserva-
tion, and tourism development. Major recent new
South Africa investments in SADC include
Botswana's Sua Pan industrial complex. Economic
liberalization and privatization open avenues for
2 Assuming the pending downstream water rights issues with
Namibia, Swaziland and Mozambique can be resolved which may
not be simple or speedy even with goodwill.
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South African investments. Having battled with
neighbours over national river frontiers, e.g. the
Orange river, South Africa is now likely to turn to
joint initiatives to develop such river basins.'2 UNEP
is active in this regard. Given South Africa's ad-
vanced natural resource management capability,
Mozambican and Tanzanian national parks for
example could benefit by advisory services from the
Kruger National Park. And so would the tourist
industry in South Africa's neighbours.
6 CONCLUSION
Given the geographical proximity and recent
histories of integrating sta tes the potential for conflict
thrives. Many national decisions have effects,
incidental or otherwise, on regional issues and
options. In this regard, Wamalwa has argued, 'The
correct attitude to regional cooperation should be
tinged with realism. Such demand for equality in the
absolute sense and exact identity were factors that we
should dispense with' (1986). Regional groupings
are easier if premised on a relatively common socio-
economic and political framework albeit there is
little to be done about divergence if it does exist.
Otherwise persistent pressures threaten their
stability and survival. The collapse of the East
African Community is a case in point albeit the rise
of a violent, expansionist military dictatorship
in Uganda post-dated the EAC Treaty and was
not readily predictable. The pre-requisites for viable
regional groupings include:
i fair distribution of costs and benefits as per-
ceived by Member States;
ii a common economic strategy at least on issues
crucial to regional coordination/integration13;
iii a reasonably common macro-economic policy
framework.
Given the peculiar features of ESA, the design of a
SADC integration scheme is significantly different
from conventional European models. Despite
SADC's strategy of reduction of dependency
especially on South Africa, in practice SADC has
deepened dependence on the industrialized coun-
tries although basically because of earned
import capacity declines since 1979 which forced a
Including some plausibility of official exchange rates.
choice between external funding and no substantial
infrastructure projects. The challenge before SADC
is to ensure foreign aid complements sub-regional
resources by raising the proportion of the latter.
Regional groupings should not overstretch their
financial and managerial resources over too many
activities, some of which could best be handled by
Member States and certainly not waste staff and
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